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1. Introduction
When there is no consensus over the risks of a product or activity, this is likely to
translate into a trade dispute, as one country restricts entry or production of what
another country sees as the legitimate object of trade. Who is right may be the
wrong question to ask, seeking as it does more objectivity than the science may be
able to provide. However, the framework of international law does need to be
able to decide whether the restrictions imposed are legitimate or not. This largely
reduces to the question of whether the restrictions fall within an explicit or implicit
exception to the general and binding principles of free trade between states.
The grounds oﬀered for such an exception are usually of one of two forms,
based on democracy or science. The ﬁrst suggests that since the scientiﬁc position is
unclear, trading systems need to respect the views of the populations of states. It is
wrong to impose a product on a people who regard it as unsafe or undesirable, and
the law does, or should, reﬂect this. The second argument says that while dangers
cannot be proved, they cannot be excluded either. It oﬀers a particular interpret-
ation of a lack of scientiﬁc proof, and is usually phrased in the language of science.
It seeks to present a precautionary approach as a correct and objective response to
the scientiﬁc evidence.
This paper suggests that neither argument is satisfactory. Democracy arguments
are incompatible with binding agreements, while arguments from science, when
the science is not conclusive, become fatuous. Really, when states disagree about
matters such as this they are not disagreeing about what they know, but about the
proper reaction to not knowing. Diﬀerent opinions on this are rooted in diﬀerent
perceptions of when and why it is justiﬁed to take risks, and who should be
allowed to do so, which is rooted in turn in perceptions about the relationships and
obligations that diﬀerent persons and institutions have to each other. The best
description of these kinds of disagreement is in terms of morality, and so the best
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form of legal exceptions to rely on are public morals clauses. These arguments are
made in the context of the recent WTO Panel Report on GMOs, the earlier US
Gambling case, and the wording of the GATT, TBT, and SBS agreements.
2. The GMO story
The dispute between the United States, Canada, and Argentina on one side, and
the European Communities and some of their Member States, on the other, over
the refusal of the latter parties to admit products that had been genetically
modiﬁed, is multi-facetted and complex.1 It raises issues of procedure, evidence,
and substance. However, underlying it is a substantive diﬀerence of opinion about
GMOs, which at times produced rhetoric suggesting the parties were poles apart.
In fact, two premises were reluctantly shared by both parties. One is that bad
things might happen as a result of genetic modiﬁcation. It is not impossible, for
example, that long-term consumption of (some of) these might have health eﬀects,
or that genes might jump to other species, with harmful eﬀects, or that GMOs
might come to drive out non-modiﬁed variations of the same plant. Such things are
not in principle incompatible with existing scientiﬁc theories, and therefore cannot
be excluded. On the other hand, it is also true that in general, and in the cases
under consideration, these things have not happened, even though some of the
products have been around for quite a while.2
Part of the case was an argument about what the two facts above tell us about
the probability of bad things happening. It will be argued below they tell us
nothing very useful. This superﬁcially scientiﬁc part of the case was facile and
relatively unimportant.
The important disagreement was about attitude. Here the Europeans empha-
sized, in the light of the ﬁrst premise, the need to be precautionary, while the
Americans emphasized, using the second, the need not to block progress. It is
argued below that the value choices underlying this diﬀerence are where the
substance of the case lies.
3. Democracy and GMOs
It is discomforting that the relatively undemocratic and commerce-oriented rules
of world trade can force a population to admit products that they genuinely do not
wish to have on their market. Whether or not the views of the majority are
rational, contemporary deference to democracy suggests that they should be able
to decide for themselves what is made and sold within their jurisdiction.3
1 European Communities – Measures Aﬀecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, DS
291, DS 292, DS 293.
2 See the Panel Report, referring to the arguments of the parties, for extensive discussion of this. See
also Chalmers (2005).
3 See Howse (2000: esp. p. 2337).
250 GARETH DAV I E S
Therefore, it might be thought, the WTO should concede to national popular
preferences on points like this.
Such a view will not work. It is the point of agreements that parties are bound.
If an agreement contains a clause allowing one party to derogate when the
majority of its population genuinely wishes to, then it barely deserves to be dis-
cussed in terms of law, or not even called an agreement at all. It is, insofar as
governments are the representatives of the majority, an at-will arrangement. Such
an arrangement would have limited stability or use.4 It would further provide a
motivation for protectionist politicians to stir up the public.5 Majoritarian popular
opinion alone cannot justify derogations from WTO law.6
4. ‘Scientific ’ arguments about scientific uncertainty
If a generation or two have eaten GMOs without any identiﬁable consequences,
then it seems reasonable to say that GMOs do not harm health. After all, the time
span for health consequences is limited, since people do not live forever. However,
some GMO risks involve a single event which is the beginning of a harmful
cascade – for example the risk of a gene crossing species, and then having a
harmful eﬀect on its new host.7 How likely is it that such an occurrence will
happen in the future? When an event is theoretically possible but has not
occurred, what is the chance that it will occur? This question is central to the
GMO dispute.
If we have enough understanding of the relevant biological mechanism, we
might be able to derive from this a probability. However, it was clear in the GMO
case that the science was not able to go this far. The only hard fact was that such an
event had not happened, but theoretically could.8
This, alas, tells us very little. If a million plants have been grown in ten years
without a harmful gene transfer, then the per-plant chance of this is probably
small. But is it, say, one in ten billion, one in two million, or in between? The ﬁrst
suggests we don’t need to worry, while the latter suggests we should, for the chance
of a transfer in the next ten years is large. Alas, the mere absence of occurrence so
far does not tell us the answer.
The current scientiﬁc position is therefore this : in many GMO contexts, we
don’t know if seriously harmful events will happen, or even how probable they are.
4 Although see Bohanes (2002: 349); Falke (2005: 356), both on the risk of non-compliance if
democratic views are ignored.
5 Falke (2005).
6 Contra, Bohanes (2002: 350–357). However, in saying why democracy should trump science he
suggests it is because it reﬂects socio-cultural values. That is not so far from the argument here. See also
Howse (2000) on the complex relationship between the WTO and democracy.
7 Chalmers (2005: 663).
8 For details see Chalmers (2005).
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The challenge is to cope with this absence of knowledge.9 That is not primarily a
scientiﬁc matter.10 Science does not provide us with an answer to the GMO dispute.
5. The morality of taking risks
There is no simple unique way to deal with not knowing the risks of an act.
However, there is inevitably a form of cost–beneﬁt analysis – in a broad sense,
more than merely economic11 – involved.12 Thus, both sides in the dispute could
probably agree that the way to make a decision on GMOs is to balance possible
gains against possible harm.
In this case, there may be some quantiﬁcation possible, of proﬁts to be made, or
of lives saved through greater production, or of the possible cost or harm of things
that might go wrong. However, not only is the possible quantiﬁcation incomplete
and uncertain, but it does not take us the whole way. Some forms of harm cannot
be easily reduced to sums. How much extra production justiﬁes a possible ex-
tinction?
The decision we arrive at depends on the value that we assign to various harms
and beneﬁts. This will vary to reﬂect diﬀerent world views on several diﬀerent
levels. Firstly, there is the essence of the acts involved; a high value placed on
individual freedom – to trade and produce – and on progress and on development
and on material well-being leads to diﬀerent conclusions than relatively higher
values on collective support, stability, and conservation, and a view of material
wealth as purely a means to an end.13 More importantly, views may diﬀer on
whether changing the nature of organisms is simply part of what mankind does, no
diﬀerent from traditional breeding, and an element of our discovery of our world
and part of the management responsibility that our strength gives us, or an ugly
intrusion into the natural order of things, an oﬀence against nature and harmony.
While there are diﬀerences between populations on these questions, most
populations do not occupy the extreme positions. The diﬀerences are of emphasis.
This makes a second level of variation in views important – diﬀering perceptions
of the importance of context. What may be morally acceptable, for example, when
done to save a life, or done by a public institution in the service of the collective
good, may not be morally acceptable when done for proﬁt, or for individual or
9 The precautionary principle is a way of answering this question. However, since it is often presented
as ‘scientiﬁc’ when it is an embodiment of a broader and culturally speciﬁc policy choice, its use often
brings more darkness than light. It also obscures the speciﬁcity of each situation.
10 See Scott (2000: 160). See also Nadine Scott (2005: 33).
11 The term ‘cost–beneﬁt analysis’ is often used by proponents and opponents in a way limiting it to
quantiﬁable or concrete advantages and disadvantages. It is used above simply to mean that a balancing or
weighing process is undertaken. As such, it can encompass for example precautionary or deliberative
approaches, rather than being opposed to them. See further Kysar (2006).
12 See Bohanes (2002: 368); Trachtman (1998: 40–58).
13 See Nadine Scott (2005: 23–24); Nelkin, Sands, and Stewart (2000: 527–528).
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even purely national beneﬁt.14 As well as the goals, there is also a question of trust
here.15 Should private institutions be allowed to control and use certain powers, or
do we feel that only publicly accountable ones have that right, as with the state
monopoly on violence, and on most kinds of weapon? Perceptions reﬂect whole
political and social philosophies, and in turn religious and metaphysical views.
This leads to another level of variation, of temperament. Is the world a frightening
place, to be treated with nervous respect, or a place to master? Is risk taking a sign
of strength and courage which brings reward, or is it childish fecklessness? Are we
optimists, or pessimists? These aﬀect our ﬁnal decision.
Insofar as governments may be taken to represent their people, it seems that
Americans and Europeans do occupy diﬀerent average positions on the scales
of views that the above questions encompass. Nor does it seem implausible that
Europeans are less inclined to think that scientiﬁc or economic advantage justiﬁes
risk.16
What is the best description of the character of these diﬀerences? It is suggested
that it is morality. Views about religion and public ethics and individual and
collective responsibilities are involved.17 We may compare decisions on GMOs
with those on abortion, stem-cell research, or even the choosing of the sex or hair
colour of a child. We are tampering with the essence of life, which is seen by some
as an inherently morally laden act, even if, in some circumstances, justiﬁed.
The essentially moral character of views on GMOs is seen by comparison with
other common dangers, such as those presented by cars or alcohol or nuclear
power stations or eating dairy products. Even most Europeans would probably
concede that the chances of concrete harm to them or their environment from these
phenomena appear to be greater than those presented by GMOs. Yet the public
reaction is diﬀerent. It is not just the risk, or degree of risk, that is the issue in
GMO debates but the absence of suﬃciently good reasons for taking the risk.18
This is where the moral reasoning enters.19
Reliance on a public morals clause to restrict entry or production of GMOs
therefore seems in principle appropriate. Diﬀerences are real and deeply felt.
Comparison with the use of such clauses in the EU context indicates that less
14 Nadine Scott (2005: 39); Douglas and Wildavsky (1982).
15 Also the question of trust in science see Bohanes (2002: 354–363); Chalmers (2005).
16 Krenzler and McGregor (2000: 302–308); Christoforou (2004: 668); Chalmers (2005: 663).
17 See First Written Submission by the European Communities, Biotech Products, 17 May 2004, para
83; ‘beyond socio-economic considerations, some countries also take into account religious and ethical
considerations’ (Chalmers, 2005: 651).
18 See Nadine Scott (2005: 39); Pildes and Sunstein (1997).
19 See Cranor (1997: 127); Howse (2000: 2351). This context speciﬁcity is also why morality may be
a better location for these arguments than the right of states to determine their own ‘appropriate level of
protection’ (See EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Beef – Hormones), DS 26, DS 48;
Australia – Measure Aﬀecting Importation of Salmon (Australia–Salmon), DS 18). Within this concept, it
is harder to ﬁnd room for varying levels of protection, especially when that variation depends partly on
factors that are not themselves related to the risk. See Peel (2004: 82–86).
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profound national diﬀerences are still respected by courts mindful of the fact that if
trade or individual freedom always trump other values, there will be a backlash.20
The question is therefore whether such morality exceptions exist within the WTO
and whether the Europeans could have relied on them, or could in the future.
6. The WTO and morality exceptions
A complete overview of morality arguments and the WTO is beyond the scope of
this paper. It will concentrate on two aspects : the ‘public morals ’ exception in the
GATT and implicitly in the TBT agreement; and the interpretation in the GMO
interim Report of the Article 5.1 SPS requirement that SPS measures must be
‘based on’ a risk assessment.
Multi-purpose measures
A measure impacting on GMOs might imaginably fall within the GATT, the TBT
agreement, or the SPS agreement, depending on its nature and formulation. For this
reason, it is worth looking at the morality position under all three. An additional
reason might be thought to lie in the ﬁnding in the GMO Report that a single
measure can fall under more than one agreement, insofar as it serves multiple
purposes – e.g. it may be SPS insofar as they protects health, and TBT insofar as it
protects the consumer.21
This broad consideration may not always be necessary. If measures primarily
protect moral sensibilities, then their purpose could be seen as unitary, so that they
fall under the TBT alone.22 They would no longer be health measures.23 However,
a moral argument can be based on a number of factors, including health con-
siderations. Insofar as measures represent a (moral) position on the right level of
health protection, they arguably continue to fall under the SPS, and insofar as they
represent a moral position on the kinds of goods that a decent society should allow
to be sold for proﬁt, they fall under the TBT. The outcome of moral arguments
under each agreement is not necessarily the same.
Public morals in the GATT and the TBT agreement
The GATT provides in Article XX that public morals are a reason for derogation
from its general provisions. The TBT provides in Article 2.2 that technical
regulations must fulﬁll a legitimate objective and lists several acceptable ones,
which do not include morality. However, the list is not exhaustive – it is preceded
by ‘ inter alia’ – and given the context of the TBT agreement as a self-expressed
20 Case 121/85 Conegate [1986] ECR 1007; Case 34/79 Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795; Case
C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039; Case C-36/02Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609. See also Ni
Chaoimh (2006: 159–160).
21 Para. 7.166 of the Panel Report.
22 Para. 7.167.
23 Ibid.
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development and continuation of the GATT it would be odd if reasons for
restriction accepted as legitimate in the GATT context were then denied in the
latter. It is suggested that morality is not often relevant to technical regulations,
and hence not on the short list of major reasons, but that need not, and should not,
be understood as meaning that if it was relevant, it could not be relied on.
However, any such implicit clause would be, it seems likely, understood and
interpreted in a way consistent with its analogue in the GATT. The question is
therefore whether the sorts of arguments made above about GMOs fall within
‘public morals’.
The word ‘public ’ is the source of diﬃculty here. ‘Public morals ’ derogations
are usually used to defend paternalistic regulations, which prevent individuals
engaging in activities which may, in the eyes of their state or community, corrupt
or degrade them. Prohibitions of pornography, gambling, and violent video games
are typical examples.24 However, such prohibitions also serve the morals of the
public collectively. This is threatened by the presence of degraded individuals, but
also by the carrying on of the immoral activity in the public sphere – sale of objects
or services, or the performance of an activity, usually. The public whose morals
need protection is comprised both of individuals tempted to engage in the act, and
those around them who are exposed to it.
GMOs seem to raise a diﬀerent kind of moral question. At ﬁrst glance, it seems
that the people committing immoral acts are not the consumers or citizens but the
producers and sellers. Therefore, it seems not to be the protection of the morals of
individuals or the community that is in issue here.
This argument can be rebutted. The fundamental objection in the GMO context
is to an immoral public act – the immoral taking of an unnecessary risk. It may be
argued that permitting the risk – the gambling with nature – that they entail is
degrading of important values, and of society. It is then a much more ‘public’
morals issue than the often private vices referred to above. Individuals may
not engage in degrading interactions with GMOs, but allowing the presence of
GMOs in the public sphere nevertheless changes the moral position of society as a
whole.
Moreover, producers and sellers, even if corporations, are also individuals with
whose morals society is and should be concerned. Insofar as they are actors in the
public sphere, the public have a similar, perhaps greater, interest in preventing
them engaging in immoral acts than in preventing natural persons from doing so.
Insofar as corporations consist of human beings, the restriction of their activities
on moral grounds is no diﬀerent from that of the restrictions imposed by law on
citizens generally.
24 Case 121/85 Conegate [1986] ECR 1007; Case 34/79 Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795; Case
C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039; Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609;
US – Measures Aﬀecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US–Gambling), DS
285.
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The Gambling Case
The only WTO case so far to address the meaning of ‘public morals ’ is the
US–Gambling case.25 This concerned a number of US measures designed to pro-
hibit primarily internet gambling via websites based in other jurisdictions. These
were defended partly on the basis of the public morals derogation in Article XIV
of the GATS, which the Appellate Body report found, unsurprisingly, should be
interpreted similarly to the analogous derogation in Article XX of the GATT.26
The Appellate Body endorsed the Panel’s ﬁnding that the protection of public
morals ‘denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf
of a community or nation’.27 It also agreed with the Panel that the US measures fell
within this deﬁnition. The Panel had found that insofar as the measures aimed to
prevent underage gambling and gambling addiction they were clearly within
public morals, and insofar as they aimed to prevent fraud and money laundering
they were arguably so. GATS also referred to public order, and these latter aims
were clearly within that, and it was not necessary to decide which was the better
heading.28 It may be suggested that since the Panel found public morals and public
order to be overlapping and related categories, the absence of any mention of
public order in the GATT probably justiﬁes a broader reading of ‘public morals ’.
Public order will not have been omitted in order to narrow the exception range,
but because it is not as obviously relevant to goods.
In any case, the decision provides reasonable support for bringing GMOs within
morality. On the one hand, the situation in US–Gambling concerned a classic
private vice. On the other, the concepts and deﬁnitions used by the Panel and
Appellate Body were broader. The legitimation for prohibiting gambling as a
morals measure was not just the protection of the souls of the gambling in-
dividuals, but the enforcement and maintenance of societal standards. The Panel,
with its deﬁnition, endorses the idea that a state is entitled to prohibit activities
that it ﬁnds inherently wrong.29 In the GMO case, one could argue that the
unnecessary manipulation of the nature of species is, like underage gambling,
contrary to European societal views of right and wrong.
Necessity and proportionality
In US–Gambling, in accordance with GATT/WTO jurisprudence on policy
exceptions in general, relying on a morals clause was found by both Panel and
25 US–Gambling. For a more complete interpretation of the scope of ‘public morals’ in US–Gambling
see Krajewski (2005: 438–445); Marwell (2006). See on the morals clause generally Feddersen (1998).
Also Jarvis (2000) for an argument, not alien to the one here, that the public morals exception can do
much more than it is currently used for.
26 Although it noted that Article XIV also refers to public order, whereas Article XX does not.
27 Para. 296 Appellate Body Report.
28 Para. 6.469 Panel report. See Krajewski (2005: 439).
29 See Broude (2005: 681–682). See Marwell (2006) and Feddersen (1998) for arguments on whether
it is necessary that all states regard the issue as a moral question, or only the one relying on the exception.
That is not to suggest that each state must have the same standards.
256 GARETH DAV I E S
Appellate Body to have two elements; the measures must serve a purpose within
the exception, and they must be necessary for this purpose. Here the Panel stated
that necessity is satisﬁed when there is no other measure ‘reasonably available’
which would provide the Member State with its desired level of protection, with
the concept of ‘reasonably available’ being determined by an objective weighing of
the interests and values at stake, in the light, inter alia, of the eﬀect on trade and
the eﬀectiveness of the measure.30
In the GMO case, the necessity nexus is largely irrelevant. If the prohibition of
GMOs is justiﬁed by protection of other species or public health, then there may
indeed be necessity arguments – about the extent of the risk again. However,
it is suggested in this paper that the immoral act is not the corruption of the
environment – which even the Europeans must concede might never happen – but
the taking of the unnecessary risk. Thus, it is the presence of GMOs in the public
sphere that is itself contrary to public morals. Clearly, there is no way to prevent
this other than by prohibiting them.
The greater problem for Europe is that its approach to GMOs is not a uniform
one.31 Some GMOs are permitted, in certain contexts, for certain uses. When states
attempt to rely on morals clauses, a common reason for their downfall is that
the oﬀending act or product, or a very similar one, is permitted in other circum-
stances. This makes it unconvincing that they have a genuine moral objection,
and usually leads courts to conclude that they are merely attempting to disguise
protectionism.32 European states therefore bear the burden of demonstrating why
the risks created by the types and uses of GMOs that they permit are quantitatively
or qualitatively diﬀerent from the risks created by the ones that they do not. Why is
this immoral and not that?
Certain distinctions will be possible. For example, there are clear diﬀerences
between using GMOs as ingredients in processed foods – breakfast cereal for
example – and importing them as whole organisms, for food or for planting. The
former might raise human health risks, but there is no danger of the cornﬂakes
spreading their genes to unmodiﬁed wheat crops. There are also diﬀerent kinds of
genes that are modiﬁed. Antibiotic or pesticide resistance might raise diﬀerent
issues than increased levels of a particular nutrient. It would not be inconsistent for
a state to permit import of products made with GMOs provided that the genes are
no longer intact or spreadable within the product, while refusing whole GMOs;
the argument being that a possible inﬂuence on health is of a diﬀerent moral nature
than the risk of a spreading gene which changes the character of species irreversi-
bly. Nor would it be inconsistent, if the science supported it, to permit organisms
with certain kinds of modiﬁcations – say higher vitamins – on the grounds that no
30 See AB report paras. 304–311, especially 308.
31 On consistency and public morals, see Marwell (2006). See also Hurt (2006).
32 See, e.g., US–Gambling, supra Henn and Darby, supra.
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harmful eﬀect could be foreseen, while refusing those with modiﬁcations which if
they spread out of context might be harmful.
These are sketched arguments. The purpose of the above paragraph is to
demonstrate that in principle, in many contexts, there is room for nuance.
However, it is for the obstructing state to demonstrate the consistency of its moral
position in each case, and that there is no less restrictive way. This means that any
morality argument against GMOs cannot be presented in isolation. It must be
shown that the objection ﬁts within a coherent and consistent pattern of behaviour
and values.33 Morality cards have to be played very precisely if they are to operate
as trumps.
On the other hand, a morality argument can be quite broad. It is possible to
argue against the importation of, for example, GMO-containing cornﬂakes be-
cause even though they present no risk to the European environment, the growing
of the crops elsewhere entailed the taking of an immoral environmental risk, which
does ultimately threaten Europe. The reality is that a variation in a species on one
continent is likely to gradually spread, so one nation or continent has a legitimate
interest in what is grown elsewhere. The environment and the global gene pool are
to some extent collective goods. A nation with ethical objections to GMOs because
of their environmental risk will be quite consistent if it then refuses to import the
products that result from the taking of that risk elsewhere; indeed its morality
argument would be much weaker and more hypocritical if it did not.
This is analogous to the on-going debate over the legitimacy of production
standards for imports.34 However, in some ways the argument is easier to make in
the context of a morals clause. If the intention is to respect the essential feeling of
states about what is right or wrong, then it is hardly consistent with this to require
them to admit products made in a way which contravenes those feelings.
‘Based on ’ risk assessment
The Panel did not ﬁnd that a legitimate SPS measure must follow inevitably from a
purely quantitative risk assessment. Indeed, it seemed to take pains to indicate that
this was not the case. Firstly, the Panel took a fairly broad view of when a risk
assessment should be made, of when there was suﬃcient scientiﬁc evidence for
this.35 It rejected many of the European arguments that such an assessment was
impossible or unnecessary in the GMO context. Consistent with this approach, it
then took a ﬂexible view of what a risk assessment should be, emphasizing that it is
not necessary to produce a quantitative assessment (although presumably that
should be done where possible).36 Even where there is not suﬃcient evidence to
33 This can be seen as a procedural approach. See Bohanes (2002: 365); Howse (2000: 2329);
McGinnis and Movsesian (2000).
34 Which is outside the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Scott (2000) and references therein. Also Jarvis
(2000).
35 Paras 7.3024–7.3027.
36 Para. 7.3027.
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quantify, or fully quantify, risks, a qualitative risk assessment may be made,
that is to say a statement of what the risks are, and perhaps some non-precise or
comparative indication of their likelihood.37
Thus, it seems that in substance the Panel is looking to see that decisions
about SPS measures begin with as much science as possible, and as much serious
examination of the risks as possible, but without a requirement that a high level
of quantitative certainty or consensus be reachable. The risk assessment is almost
a procedural requirement, demonstrating that the factual premises upon which
decisions are based are as objective and depoliticized as possible.38
More importantly, the Panel then went on to discuss the relationship between a
risk assessment and the ﬁnal decision. Once again, it was notably ﬂexible. To
justify a measure it is not at all necessary that the risk assessment conclude with a
picture of inevitable doom, or even that it make any particular ﬁnal decision
inevitable. Rather it must be the case that there is a ‘rational relationship between
a risk assessment and the SPS measure taken, or in other words, that the results of
the risk assessment must ‘‘suﬃciently warrant ’’ or ‘‘reasonably support ’’ the SPS
measure at issue’.39
This is spelling out that there is room for further argument between the risk
assessment and the ﬁnal decision. One must begin with its ﬁndings, and use these
as a base from which to rationally proceed. Inevitably, in this consequent phase of
policy development, factors other than those in the risk assessment will be used.40
For example, if a risk assessment concludes that there is a real chance of a pesticide
killing wild animals, a decision maker would take this as a starting point, but also
consider the relative values that should be placed on wild animals and on increased
production – for example – in coming to a conclusion. Decisions might be diﬀerent
in diﬀerent countries. There is nothing in the GMO decision to suggest that such a
manner of proceeding would be contrary to the SPS agreement. Rather it seems
that the headline requirement is one of rationality.41 The aim of Article 5.1 SPS
and the risk assessment requirement is to produce processes of decision making
which have a transparent and somewhat standardized form, in order to make the
objectivity and rationality of their content accessible to judicial assessment.42
Hence the separation of the risk assessment process from culturally speciﬁc con-
siderations.43 This is about making law out of politics.
37 In Beef–Hormones the Appellate Body suggests for risks to be the subject of a risk assessment they
must be identiﬁable – they must have some concreteness. This is not the same as saying that they must be
either quantiﬁable or substantial. See EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R at para. 186. For a contrary interpretation see Ni Chaoimh (2006: 151–153).
38 See note 33 above.
39 Para. 7.3028 Panel Report.
40 Christoforou (2004: 680–681).
41 Para. 7.3028.
42 See note 33 above; Howse (2000: 2335).
43 Paras 7.3242–7.3243.
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The above interpretation is strengthened by the concession that risk assessments
need not be quantitative.44 A qualitative risk assessment is inherently open-ended,
and, extreme situations apart,45 does not entail any particular conclusion. Rather
it sets out the possible scenarios and events that have to be taken account of.46
Such a risk assessment does not provide the ﬁnal answer, but begins the process
of reasoning towards it.47 It is data about how a given society believes those
scenarios should be responded to that enables the reasoning process to be com-
pleted.
One danger is that risk assessments will be too narrow. The natural tendency of
scientists may be to concentrate on what can be proved or disproved – which is
little – in order to maximize their authoritativeness, and the natural tendency of
those commissioning them may be to ask only for black-and-white answers.
Rather, a responsible piece of scientiﬁc advice should identify what, on the basis of
current scientiﬁc knowledge, could happen in the future, even if the chance of this
cannot be quantiﬁed. This provides the political decision maker with a basis for
rational choice.
7. Conclusion
In choosing to make their arguments scientiﬁc both sides in this case lost
credibility. The argument that ‘ it has not been proved to cause harm’ is childish
and at odds with sensibly precautionary policy.48 Many true things have not been
proved; otherwise there would be no new research needed. On the other hand,
the European attempt to present their fears as objectively rooted in science was
misguided.49 They had no hard results making theirs the only rational response.
Rather they had a set of deeply culturally speciﬁc responses to uncertainty.
The decision shows that they could have been more honest. There is room
for diﬀerent values within all the agreements, provided that these values can
be explained and communicated and ﬁtted within a rational argument – as
they can.
This suggestion may seem to undermine the trade agreements. There is certainly
a less than clear line between the democracy argument, rejected above, and the
morality arguments proposed. Why is ‘we don’t want to’ unacceptable, whereas
‘we don’t want to because we think it’s wrong’ is legitimate? The diﬀerence must
44 7.3027.
45 See para 7.3058.
46 See 7.3064.
47 Peel (2004: 61–68); Howse (1998: 2341).
48 Christoforou (2004: 637).
49 It may reﬂect a desire to mask political decisions in the language of technocracy, something perhaps
a result of internal EU debates about legitimacy. Factors rooted in internal EU politics may thus feed
through in a non-constructive way to its external relations. See Christoforou, 2004: 680–682 and
686–687).
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lie in time and depth. The mood of the public is ﬁckle and an aversion at a given
moment cannot be the basis for law.50 However, values which can be shown – by
argument and evidence – to be genuine, rooted and consistent are diﬀerent.
We allow countries to prohibit pornography. It follows that we should allow
them to prohibit the import and sale of GMOs. Nor do we have to be blind
to nuance; allowing genetic modiﬁcation under some circumstances does not
necessarily undermine a moral objection to it under others, any more than
permitting medical textbooks undermines the moral case for a prohibition of
public nudity.
An important consideration is protectionism: a popular preference which has
this eﬀect looks more like opportunistic rejection of trade commitments than a
genuine moral view.51 The more diﬃcult consideration is temporal. Most reliance
on morals clauses refers to a moral preference which predates the trade problem.
Choices to prohibit alcohol, violent games, or pornography which are domes-
tically long standing are more convincing in this context than those which appear
to emerge contemporaneously with the oﬀending products. Here GMOs have
a problem, because as a genuinely new product there is no obvious historical
or cultural preference to rely on. Finding their place in trade law involves con-
textualizing the ethical issues they raise.
In particular, although religion was not referred to in the decision and is not
something that trade lawyers will rush to embrace as a factor in their advice
to clients, some of the problems dealing with GMOs arise because they do
not yet have a comfortable place in the conventional religious moralities.
Prohibitions – alcohol and pornography again and weapons – which have a clear
and traditional link with conventional interpretations of major religions are
accepted.52 Whatever others may think of them, we all know that one cannot and
should not try and force lands to embrace what their belief rejects, at least within
limits. Had Abraham, Jesus, or Mohammed spoken about modifying plants, the
law might have taken quite a diﬀerent turn. Yet for many people, their views on
genetic modiﬁcation do derive directly or indirectly – via modern secular phil-
osophies that have been inﬂuenced by religion – from the religious values that
pervade societies, and as it becomes accepted that attitudes to GMOs, like atti-
tudes to abortion or stem-cell research are partly the result of the sort of beliefs
that courts do well not to tangle with, perhaps it will be easier to give resistance a
rational place in the law. If a land can discover for itself what standpoint it is led to
on GMOs by its pre-existing cultural and religious views, this will help legitimate
and explain its position to others.
50 C.f. Howse (2000: 2343).
51 Assuming here that moral views on products are independent of their national origin. The
alternative is imaginable, but raises very complex questions.
52 See Broude (2005).
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It is important that accommodation of belief by adjudicators takes place. There
is no single best way of facing the unknown, andWTO law is not intended to create
one.53 Then it would be more than trade law but the translation of a particular
philosophy of life to the international arena, an unacceptably undemocratic and
sneaky way of legislating for gung-ho liberalism.54 This may have been its inten-
tion. It is certainly to some extent the product of a Victorian modernist belief in
progress and industry, and there are no doubt many for whom removing obstacles
to free exchange of goods and services, and removing superstitious obstacles to
scientiﬁc progress are but two sides of the same rationalist coin. Yet the writers of
the agreements, while they may have shared these sentiments, chose not to make
them part of the law, and the WTO is open to those of diverse philosophies. It is
provincialism – American, economic, or otherwise – to think that agreeing to free
trade entails agreeing to admit GMOs.
At the same time, there are problems involved in engaging with the types of
morality arguments outlined here. Many will be unhappy about giving an inter-
national trade panel jurisdiction over such questions, which may seem like an
extension of its jurisdiction beyond what is legitimate. Should it be the Appellate
Body that has the last word on whether a state can prohibit pornography,
gambling, GMOs or weapons, or that determines the limits of acceptable
environmental policy?55
The problem is unavoidable. Trade has an impact on non-economic matters.
Excluding these from international adjudication entails a greater loss of national
control than the alternative, since then trade will take precedence without ado.
Nor can one give states the last word on derogations without destroying any
pretence to a binding agreement. The only alternative is for the adjudicator to look
at the broader picture.
The key to rendering this legitimate is not to ask the trade court whether a moral
view is right or wrong or sensible, but whether it is genuine and consistent. The
emphasis must be on showing that the rule is in fact an authentic reﬂection of
moral views within that jurisdiction. This is what states will ﬁnd diﬃcult, what
Europe failed to do before the Panel, and what needs to be done in the future.
A wide range of evidence needs to be mustered, from the sociological to the
national-legal, to demonstrate that public morals is not simply a label being
opportunistically attached to protectionism. Reasoning will have to be much
tighter and more careful, and at the same time draw on a wider range of data, than
governments appear to be used to. However, they have much to gain; the chance
to preserve the values of their society.
53 See Nadine Scott (2005: 24).
54 Ibid. Her paper discusses how these normative arguments about risk and political philosophy
nevertheless enter the WTO by the backdoor via rhetoric.
55 See Trachtman (1998).
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